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Purpose: On 1 August 2020, the EU-Vietnam Free Trade Agreement went into force. After 
completing the EU-Vietnam Investment Protection Agreement's ratification, the two 
agreements will create the legal basis of strong economic relations between the parties. 
However, we argue that these agreements are an element of a broader strategy, pursuing the 
EU's economic and socio-political goals. 
Design/Methodology/Approach: The research is interdisciplinary, economic, and legal. We 
analyze the process of establishing the legal framework of EU-Vietnam relations and its 
context in the New Haven School's application schema, combining it with "rational choice." 
The research was conducted based on public statistics and analysis of the literature on the 
subject. 
Findings: The EU pursues a policy of "change through trade." The agreements deepen 
Vietnam's participation in the universal economic and social system based on the UN Charter's 
values. They also strengthen the institutionalization of pluralism in relations in the Asia region 
and institutions and countries outside the region. 
Practical Implications: EVFTA and EVIPA represent a new approach of the EU to trade 
agreements and how to influence international relations in a system where the U.S. have lost 
their status as the only superpower, and China seeks to become a real global superpower. 
Realizing this change in EU trade policy is important for all Member States and other 
international relations actors.  
Originality/Value: The paper discusses important and current issues related to EU trade and 
investment policies and can develop future policy scenarios.  
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The UE-Vietnam Free Trade and Investment Protection Agreements:  




On 1 August 2020, the Free Trade Agreement between the European Union and the 
Socialist Republic of Viet Nam entered into force. The EU-Vietnam Free Trade 
Agreement (hereafter: EVFTA) co-creates – together with the EU-Vietnam 
Investment Protection Agreement (hereafter: EVIPA) – the legal framework for the 
economic relations of the European Union and its Member States with Vietnam. These 
are the first EU agreements of this kind signed with a developing Asian country 
(European Commission, 2020a).  
 
The two agreements are closely linked, which is confirmed, among others, by Article 
1.2 of EVFTA, which indicates that the purpose of the agreement is to liberalize not 
only trade but also investment. The establishment of EVIPA is accompanied by the 
termination of 21 bilateral investment treaties (BITs) of the member states with 
Vietnam.  
 
In the paper, we argue that the agreements with Vietnam concluded by the EU are an 
element of a broader EU strategy, pursuing economic and socio-political goals, and 
they affect not only relations between the parties but also pluri or even multilateral 
ones. In this way, the EU pursues a policy of “change through trade”3 directly 
implementing the EU political norms expressed in the Treaty on European Union 
(TEU). A recent statement of German Ambassador to Vietnam, Dr. Guido Hildner 
confirms this attitude: “The agreement is not just about tariffs. It will modernize the 
Vietnamese economy” (EVFTA Offers a Way to Post-Pandemic Growth, 2020). 
 
We prove that the agreements strengthen the trend of institutionalization of pluralism 
in relations both between Asian countries and with institutions and countries outside 
the region (moving away from the “hub-and-spoke”4 model of relations), and also 
sustain a universal system of “free and fair trade” (European Commission and 
Directorate-General for Trade, 2015) and build trans-regional cooperation for the 
return of strategic partner (USA) and the stopping of strategic rivals (China and 
Russia) of both the EU and Vietnam. 
 
The research is interdisciplinary, economic, and legal. We analyze the process of 
establishing the legal framework of EU-Vietnam relations and its context in the New 
Haven School’s application schema, combining it with “rational choice” (Druzin, 




3With regard to Vietnam, these activities were initiated in 2001 with the Multilateral Trade 
Policy Support Project (and continued under MUTRAP's formulas: I, II, III) (EU-MUTRAP 
Project Promotes Vietnam’s Deeper Trade Integration, 2017). 
4Network of bilateral alliances in which one state plays the central role of the “hub” and the 
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2. The Importance of Agreements – The Global and Regional Perspective 
 
The process of establishing closer economic and investment relations between the EU 
and Vietnam started in June 2012. In December 2015, the negotiations were 
completed, and since then, the agreements have been "frozen" for the next two years 
– they were waiting for political decisions. At that time, the disputes over detailed 
tariff regulations were ongoing. Finally, on June 30, 2019, the agreements were 
signed. The European Parliament ratified the agreements on 12 February 2020, 
Vietnam's National Assembly approved the agreements on June 8, 2020.  
 
Paradoxically, the delay in signing the agreements turned out to be in their favor. On 
the one hand, the successive EU agreements with the region's countries (including 
Japan and Singapore) entered into force. On the other hand, partners' importance in 
mutual relations has increased: Vietnam has been promoted to 2nd place among 
ASEAN countries as the EU trade partner. 
 
The investment agreement still awaits ratification of the EU Member States. 
Separating the agreements was aimed at separating their ratification, i.e., treating 
independently matters falling within the EU's exclusive competence and matters of 
shared competence (European Commission, 2020b). This separation results from the 
Lisbon Treaty norms, according to which the investment matter is subject to shared 
competences between the EU and its Member States (as a result of Opinion 2/15 of 
the EU Court of Justice issued in the context of the FTA with Singapore). 
 
The agreements are the legal and institutional basis of cooperation between the parties, 
and at the same time, may significantly affect their mutual relations (and relations 
with other countries). Many internal and external factors determine Their importance. 
Among them, the issues mentioned below cannot be omitted. 
 
First of all, the agreements are created in turbulent conditions that undermine the 
multilateral system of international economic cooperation. The shocks include both 
standards and institutions. The freezing of negotiations at the WTO (in the Doha 
Round formula) was accompanied by further actions, mainly from the USA. These 
are: enforcing changes in NAFTA5, breaking negotiations on the Transatlantic Trade 
and Investment Partnership (TTIP), abandoning the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), 
terminating the Paris Climate Agreement, blocking the WTO dispute settlement 
mechanism6, and Brexit. They all make up the indicated process. States and 
 
5NAFTA’s renegotiations led to its amendments and the signing of a new agreement on 
November 30, 2018, i.e. the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement. USMCA changes, in 
line with the official position of the U.S. Ministry of Commerce, the win-win formula replaces 
the win-lose formula: “mutually beneficial win for North American workers, farmers, 
ranchers, and businesses” (USTR, n.d.). 
6From December 2019, as a consequence of Trump administration’s refusal to appoint new 
members,  the Appellate Body does not function and it cannot resolve appeals against reports 
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international institutions are faced with the Manichaean alternative: multi- or 
unilateralism, and the choice can be made either through a procedure of universal 
agreement (maintaining the modified system) or through facta concludentia (collapse 
of the existing order). 
 
Secondly, these are the first EU agreements after the UK withdrew from it. Therefore, 
they reflect the perception of the EU in international economic relations after Brexit 
and will be the starting point for the legal framework of relations between the UK and 
Vietnam. Of course, it is not easy to see them in the category of potential substitution 
for Great Britain with Vietnam, but the factors that contribute to Vietnam's economic 
and social potential cannot be underestimated. According to data for 2020, Vietnam 
has a population of over 97 million (vs. 65 million in the UK), including about 51 
million working people (the UK about 30 million), covers an area of 331,210 km2 
(the UK – 243,610 km2) and has a GDP per capita (in PPP) of 7463 USD (vs. 46 782 
USD in the UK). The Vietnamese armed forces have 412,000 soldiers (British: about 
400,000), while the military outlays oscillate around 5.5 billion USD (UK – 55.1 
billion USD) (Global Firepower, 2020). 
 
Thirdly, as subsequent ones that have already been concluded between the EU and 
Asian countries, these agreements are an important element of building a bridge 
between the EU and Asia. This is particularly important given the EU and the West's 
challenges in the Asia-Pacific region by their strategic rivals, i.e., Russia and China, 
and the uncertainty caused by the USA's policy (the EU's strategic partner). 
 
Fourthly, by concluding agreements with Asian countries, the EU can build a new 
institutional architecture for security cooperation in the Asian region. In this way, the 
EU is broadening the circle of its Asian partners (the core of this circle are the 
participants of the “Democratic Security Diamond,” i.e., Australia, India, and Japan) 
and strengthening cooperation between ASEAN countries7. The creation of such a 
new architecture of cooperation in the region is a strategic objective of the EU. It is 
confirmed by the UE Commissioner for Trade, Cecilia Malmström: “After Singapore, 
Vietnam is the second ASEAN country with which the EU has concluded trade and 
investment agreements. Therefore, the agreements are also an important step towards 
the EU’s ultimate goal of securing trade and investment agreements with the whole 
ASEAN region.” (Guide to the EU-Vietnam Trade and Investment Agreements, n.d., 
p. 7).  
 
 
7EU negotiations with ASEAN are suspended, but agreements with Malaysia, Thailand, the 
Philippines, Indonesia, Vietnam and Singapore, among others, are being considered as a step 
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In turn, the U.S., like China, has based regional security on asymmetrical bilateral 
agreements (rather than plurilateral ones, as the Washington Treaty8). It is a system of 
“hub-and-spokes” alliances. In this system, the USA has assigned a strategic partner 
to Japan, and the EU does the same. This ensured that the United States had a 
maximum influence on the countries of the region while minimizing the risk of the 
USA being drawn into the conflict provoked by the allies in the region9. By building 
cooperation in a plurilateral regime, the EU is convinced that the policy of the region's 
countries under the new leadership is/will be rational and predictable, respecting 
universal values and standards. 
 
Fifthly, the agreements are embedded in a socio-political context, but at the same time, 
the parties point to mutual economic benefits, so they are win-win agreements. By 
concluding traité-loi agreements (and not traité-contrat), the parties have 
demonstrated the mutual trust that results from the same system of values.The 
agreements and their implementation are correlated with the determinants of the 
socio-political-economic systems in terms of their common sets. Trust and (limited) 
community of values were prerequisites for the conclusion of agreements. The 
implementation of agreements both increases the level of trust and extends the catalog 
of these common values. 
 
In the desired scenario of the evolution of international relations, in which the USA 
will move away from the America First concept, the new architecture will not mean a 
new building erected on the previous one's ruins. A patchwork that considers various 
elements (norms and institutions) and accepts the consequences of cultural differences 
seems possible and desirable. The patchwork model's strategic character in the case 
of the EU manifests itself in combining relations and bilateral agreements with pluri- 
and multilateral ones. 
 
3. The Origins of UE-Vietnam Relations 
 
Analyzing EU-Vietnam relations, it is impossible to escape the recent past 
(Ostaszewski, 2000). France colonized Indochina in the second half of the 19th 
century. This presence was interrupted by Japanese aggression in 1941. France then 
sought to recover the “French Indochina” after the end of World War II. The USA did 
not support this idea. Indochina's international armed conflict began in 1946, and the 
First Indochina War lasted until 20 July 1954 (Dalloz, 2015). The beginning of this 
 
8The equivalent of the 1949 treaty structure was initiated in Asia only in 2006 under the East 
Asia Summit formula. However, the USA indicated its readiness for an evolutionary change in 
the United States Security Strategy for the East Asia-Pacific Region (the so-called Nye 
Initiative) of 1995 (United States Security Strategy for the East Asia-Pacific Region, 1995). 
9The USA wanted to protect the region from communism, but also the world from the Third 
World War. Politicians at the head of the allied governments, such as Syngman Ree (South 
Korea), Chiang Kai-shek (China) or Ngô Đình Diệm (South Vietnam) were irrational (from a 
Western perspective) and unpredictable and prone to violence. This was common to them and 
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conflict was caused by the failure to accept the Potsdam Conference's findings (1945) 
to establish a line of zones of influence in Indochina to the north and south of the 16th 
parallel. After a period of low-intensity internal conflict, it escalated from 1949 to war 
between France and Vietnam (the antagonists benefited from military aid from the 
U.S., the USSR, and China). The war in Korea (1950) became a factor that intensified 
this war and directly involved the USA. The military action included Laos and 
Cambodia, and Vietnam, which resulted in the West recognizing Indochina's war as a 
crusade against communism. France's failure in the war was concluded by the defeat 
at the Battle of Dien Bien Phu. During the 1954 peace conference, it was agreed that 
Indochina would be divided along the 17th parallel. 
 
The next stage of the war began on November 1, 1955 and ended with Saigon's fall 
on April 30, 1975. This Second Indochina War – formally between North Vietnam 
and South Vietnam – was de facto a war between the Eastern Bloc10 and the West11 – 
and became a “Hot War” (a component of the “Cold War”) fought by their 
representatives (the so-called proxy war12). In the war, millions of residents of 
Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia and over 58,000 US citizens were killed and injured. 
 
An important factor influencing the course of the wars in Indochina was their 
perception of world public opinion. Already the First Indochina War was described 
by propaganda as a dirty war. Aversion to Western policy increased during the Second 
Indochina War, and the Eastern Bloc won Western society's sympathy. Indochina's 
conflicts contributed to social change in the West, and it seems that these were the 
only lasting changes. 
 
After the reunification of Vietnam, the real face of the communists in the region and 
the world became more and more visible. Mass repression, which directly claimed 
more than 300,000 victims and the collapse of the economy, caused about one million 
people (so-called boat people) to flee Vietnam (UNHCR, 2000, p. 98). In neighboring, 
also communist, Cambodia, genocide took place between 1975 and 1979, resulting in 
the murder of between 1.5 and 2 million people, or ¼ of the population. The crime 
victims were different population groups, the selection was based on social, ethnic, 
religious, etc. criteria, but generally, the crime was mass, systemic and systematic 
 
10The USSR, China and other countries of the bloc participated directly and indirectly in 
various forms on the side of North Vietnam. 
11South Vietnam was supported mainly by the USA, but also by South Korea, the Philippines, 
Thailand, Australia and other Western countries. It is impossible to overestimate the financial 
assistance from Western Europe (especially Germany and Great Britain), which accepted the 
overvalued American currency in trade exchange (Dickens, 2005, pp. 213–216).  
12These are wars in which non-state military groups benefit from direct assistance from 
external powers (Hughes, 2012, p. 11). During the Cold War, this term was used to describe 
regional wars as a substitute for direct confrontation between the great powers (Bar-Siman-
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(Jones, 2006, pp. 185–206)13. Vietnam did not react until Cambodia directly attacked 
it – in response, in 1978, the Vietnamese army defeated Cambodian forces and began 
its occupation (which lasted till 1989). 
 
The Sino-Vietnamese alliance quickly broke up, which is symbolized by the Sino-
Vietnamese war (referred to as the Third Indochina War), which began on February 
17, 1979, with the attack on Vietnam and lasted less than a month, until March 16 
(Gompert et al., 2014, pp. 117-127). The USSR was relatively neutral in this conflict 
– it helped Vietnam with military equipment. The Chinese attack was a reaction to the 
persecution of the Chinese people (Hao) in Vietnam and the Vietnamese invasion of 
Cambodia in 1978.  
 
Communist propaganda long denied the facts and treated genocide as a propaganda 
war against the Eastern Bloc countries. The change occurred only after the victory of 
Vietnam over Cambodia. The Eastern Bloc (USSR) supported Vietnam’s actions and 
admitted that genocide took place. However, disputes between anti-Western states 
involved in the Indochina wars, the disclosure of their internal policies, and the 
evolution towards post-communist dictatorships14 with a private non-market economy 
deprived these states of external public support.  
 
The aideological conflicts between the ex-allies are still ongoing. China's withdrawal 
from the Vietnamese territories (1992) has not ended the border disputes. In its policy 
and towards the countries of the region, Russia combines expansionism with the 
pursuit of unilateral benefits (not guided by any values)15. 
 
To Vietnam, one can refer to the saying, “everything had to change so that nothing 
would change.” On the one hand, the Vietnamese lost the image of a small brave 
nation that resisted the imperialists independently. On the other hand, Vietnam now 
functions as a predictable partner in international relations, which respects the 
principles and norms of international law, so that trade and investment agreements 
can be concluded with it. 
 
4.  The Justification of “Change through Trade” Policy 
 
American involvement in Vietnam and the Indochina region was derived from 
adopting the "domino theory." According to this theory, the effect of the communists 
(representing the USSR) taking over one country was to dominate the entire region 
 
13Referring to this work is not tantamount to sharing the authors’ views with regard to other 
cases. 
14Economic reforms in Vietnam are carried out within the framework of the doi moi policy 
(restoration), which does not include changes in socio-political life; Vietnam is not a 
democracy, but the level of respect for human rights and freedoms is increasing. 
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and then the rest of the world. As a result, the U.S. and its allies set up "firewalls" in 
individual regions to stop the march of communists. In Asia, the West decided to set 
up a firewall on Vietnamese territory16. A separate issue (from the "domino theory") 
is the determination of the line of defense, which neither had to run in Vietnam nor 
was Vietnam predisposed to fulfill this role (for geopolitical reasons). 
 
The "domino theory" can now manifest itself in the fact that Vietnam's transformation 
is co-existing with international relations changes, radiating outwards. In January 
2007, Vietnam was admitted to the WTO. Between 2015 and 2016, it concluded 
several free trade agreements17, including – politically symbolic – with South Korea 
in 2015 (Viet Nam - South Korea (VKFTA), 2015) and the Eurasian Economic Union 
in 2016 (Free Trade Agreement between the Eurasian Economic Union and Vietnam, 
2016). The EU's agreement was preceded by Vietnam's ratification on November 15, 
2018, of the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership 
(CPTPP) (CPTTP Text and Resources, n.d.). 
 
The process of normalization of relations between the West and Vietnam has been 
slow. There were many reasons for this, both bilateral18 and those resulting from 
Vietnam’s policies (Vietnamese attack on Cambodia). The advocates of openness in 
American policy towards Vietnam were veterans, American war heroes, senators John 
McCain and John Kerry. It was not until 20 years after Saigon's fall, on July 11, 1995, 
that US President Bill Clinton announced a formal normalization of relations; liaison 
offices were elevated to embassies, and two consulates were opened. Regular political 
dialogue on security has been established, and a dialogue on human rights is ongoing. 
The 2006 agreement regulated trade relations. Since 2017, a Permanent Normal Trade 
Relations Act has been in force for Vietnam, under which Vietnam is a beneficiary of 
the Most Favoured Nation (MFN) clause. At the same time, since 2020, Vietnam has 
lost its status as a “developing country” in the U.S., which subjects it to the 
requirements of not harming the American industry and depriving it of its preferences. 
 
16See the statement by President D.D. Eisenhower at the April 7, 1954 press conference: 
“Finally, you have broader considerations that might follow what you would call the "falling 
domino" principle. You have a row of dominoes set up, you knock over the first one, and what 
will happen to the last one is the certainty that it will go over very quickly. So you could have 
a beginning of a disintegration that would have the most profound influences.” (Quotes of 
President Dwight D. Eisenhower, n.d.). The implementation of a strategy in line with this 
theory was the joint work of Presidents Truman and Eisenhower (continued by their 
successors) and developed by George Kennan and Dean Acheso. See more: (Cha, 2009). 
17They were preceded by the Economic Partnership Agreement with Japan (entered into force 
in 2009) and the FTA with Chile (2014). 
18It is about prisoners of war and graves of soldiers – according to official American data, the 
fate of 1763 Americans in Southeast Asia is undetermined, including 1353 in Vietnam; there 
are also no data on 31 prisoners out of 883 captured in the region, including 627 in Vietnam. 
According to the Report of the Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs United States Senate of 
13 January 1993 there are no prisoners of war held in Vietnam (Report of the Senate Select 
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The cooperation covers various areas of interest to the parties19. However, these 
relations are now among the USA's closest in the region (Albert, 2019). The U.S. 
considers Vietnam to be an important partner in the region in resisting the strategic 
challenge posed by China (Kurlantzick, 2015). The Vietnamese side similarly 
assesses relations with the U.S., as expressed directly by Vietnamese Prime Minister 
Nguyen Tan Dung on May 31, 2013, in the opening speech of IISS Asia Defense 
Summit (Shangri-La Dialogue)20. 
 
It can be considered – especially in the conditions of the “trade war” between the U.S. 
China that Vietnam can influence the global game as a domino effect. While the 
victory of the communists as a result of the collapse of the non-communist 
government in Vietnam did not lead to a defeat for the West, neither in Asia nor in 
the world, Vietnam’s accession to the family of free nations can significantly 
influence the development of global social relations. In this case, the EU’s consistent 
policy strategy of “change through trade” may prove more effective than any other 
strategy (Wouters et al., 2015). 
 
5. The Economic Determinants of EU-Vietnam Agreements 
 
Regardless of the importance that the parties attribute to non-economic values and 
objectives, their decision to conclude the agreements, assess their impact, and their 
implications for the international environment had/have/will have economic effects. 
Therefore, the starting point is an analysis of the parties' quantified economic 
potentials in comparative terms. 
 
While analyzing the economic position of Vietnam, we notice huge changes that have 
taken place in the last three decades and resulted in a reduction of the distance between 
Vietnam and other countries in the region and the European Union (Figure 1). On 
average, since 1990 till 2019, the GDP growth rate of Vietnam has been 6.8% per 
year, while in countries with similar income (lower-medium according to the World 
Bank classification), it was 4.7%, and in the countries of East Asia and the Pacific in 
 
19Among them is cooperation against drug production and trafficking. 
20He said: „I believe that no regional country would oppose the strategic engagement of extra-
regional powers if such engagement aims to enhance cooperation for peace, stability and 
development. We could expect more in the roles played by major powers, particularly the 
United States and China , the two powers having the biggest roles (I underline the biggest) in 
and responsibilities to the future of their own as well as that of the region and the world. What 
is important is that such expectation should be reinforced by strategic trust and such strategic 
trust must be reflected by concrete and constructive actions of these nations. We attach special 
importance to the roles played by a vigorously rising China and by the United States - a Pacific 
power. We would expect and support the United States and China once their strategies and 
actions conform to international law, respect the independence and sovereignty of nations, not 
only bringing about benefits to them but also contributing genuinely to our common peace, 
cooperation and prosperity.” (Vietnam PM’s Keynote Address at 12th Shangri-La Dialogue, 
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general – 4.2%. The GDP growth rate in the EU during this period averaged 1.8% per 
year. Although China was growing faster (9.3% per year on average) than Vietnam at 
the time, the two Asian economies have been growing at an even pace in recent years. 
In 2019 the Vietnamese economy grew even 1 pp faster than the Chinese one, and the 
IMF forecasts for 2020 1.2% of GDP growth in China and 2.7% in Vietnam (IMF, 
2020).  
 
Importantly, both in the years of the Asian crisis (1997-1998) and the recent financial 
crisis (2008-2009), Vietnam proved to be more resilient to shocks, neither 
experiencing such a sharp slowdown in GDP growth (see Figure 1) nor recording an 
absolute decline in per capita income (which occurred in the countries of East Asia 
and the Pacific in 1997-1998 and the EU in 2008-2009). 
 
Figure 1 Annual GDP growth in Vietnam and selected countries and regions (%), 
1990-2019 
 
Source: Own study based on (World Bank, 2020a). 
 
As a result, the relative wealth of the Vietnamese has increased greatly. While in 1990, 
income per capita in Vietnam (in PPP, constant 2017 international dollars) accounted 
for about 33% of GDP per capita of the East Asia and Pacific countries, 58% of GDP 
of lower-middle-income countries, and 6% of the EU's GDP per capita, in 2019 these 
values were 45%, 122%, and 18% respectively (see Figure 2). An exception is the 
relation of Vietnamese GDP per capita to the Chinese one.  
 
In 1990, the GDP per capita in Vietnam was above China's level, while in 2019, it was 
half that of China. Given the IMF's forecasts of much higher GDP growth in Vietnam 
in the coming years than in the reference groups of countries, the distance between 
Vietnam and they should be decreasing. Moreover, Vietnam is among few countries 
that achieved positive growth during the COVID-19 pandemic (World Bank estimates 
2.8% growth in 2020, while in the whole East Asia and Pacific region 0.5%, in China 





































































































Vietnam East Asia & Pacific China







Andżelika Kuźnar, Jerzy Menkes  
225 
Figure 2 Ratio of real GDP per capita (PPP, constant 2017 international $) of 
Vietnam to selected countries and regions, 1990-2019 
 
Source: Own study based on (World Bank, 2020a). 
 
In recent years, many multinational companies have moved production facilities from 
China to Vietnam in response to rising labor costs in China and diversifying locations. 
The truce concluded in early 2020 between the United States and China on trade 
policy has only briefly reduced the risk of global and regional tensions. However, this 
risk is still high, making other countries more attractive in the region (including 
Vietnam). As shown in Figure 3, there is a link between the volume of FDI inflows to 
Vietnam and the uncertainty of economic policy in China21.  
 
In turn, the 2020 COVID-19 pandemic has significantly reduced business activity in 
China and disrupted global supply networks (Gereffi, 2020; Ivanov, 2020), which 
speaks against the current strategy of corporations concentrating investment in one 
place and increases the chances of Vietnam to attract even more foreign capital (FDI 
Data Shows Vietnam’s Steady Performance in First Half of 2020, 2020).  
 
However, it is difficult to predict how the experience of disrupting supply chains will 
affect future economic decisions, i.e., the extent to which institutional regulators and 
companies will be willing to diversify their sources of supply, to reduce, as far as 
possible, dependence on geographically distant suppliers; to what extent and for how 
long higher prices will be accepted in exchange for higher supply chain security. It 
can be assumed that the risk weights will be changed about the price weights when 
making decisions on production chains. 
 
One way to minimize the risks associated with a potential increase in protectionism 
in the world and the disruption of the supply network in the region is Vietnam's 
participation in trade and investment liberalization agreements. Numerous trade 
agreements to which Vietnam is a party serve this purpose. 
 
 
21The index is based on the analysis of articles in the South China Morning Post (SCMP), 
Hong Kong’s leading English language newspaper. Methodology of the index can be found 
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Figure 3 FDI inflow to Vietnam and the economic policy uncertainty index in China 
 
Source: Own study based on (Economic Policy Uncertainty Index, n.d.) and (UNCTADstat, 
n.d.). 
 
The importance of the trade and investment agreements (EVFTA and EVIPA) 
concluded by the EU and Vietnam for each party is different and is largely due to 
differences in their economies' size. The EU economy is about 59 times larger than 
Vietnamese, the average European is 5.5 times more affluent than Vietnamese 
(according to purchasing power parity), the population of Vietnam is over five times 
lower than the EU. The structure of Vietnam's GDP is outdated, characteristic of low-
income countries, with agriculture having 14% of the value-added (but it is 
decreasing, from 39% in 1990 and 24% in 2000, mainly for the benefit of industry) 
with almost 40% of working force employed in this sector (see Table 1).  
 
Since 1986, Vietnam has been undergoing an economic transformation. The 
government elected in 2016 has declared to modernize the country further and reduce 
the role of the state in the economy, fight against corruption, and speed up 
administrative reforms to promote sustainable growth based on the private sector. 
Therefore, there is a potential to shift production factors to manufacturing and services 
and use them there more efficiently. It also provides opportunities for EU actors to 
exploit these opportunities profitably. 
 
Table 1. Share of sectors in value-added and employment in 2019 in Vietnam, the 
lower-middle income countries and the EU (in %)   
UE Vietnam  Lower-middle income 
countries 
Agriculture Value added 1.6 14.0 15.1  
Employment 4.4 37.4 39.5 
Industry Value added 22.2 34.5 27.0 
 
Employment 24.9 27.6 22.4 
Services Value added 65.5 41.6 50.6  
Employment 70.7 35.0 38.1 
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6. The Economic Linkages between Vietnam and the UE 
 
Bilateral trade and investment links between the EU and Vietnam have been steadily 
strengthening, from the establishment of diplomatic between the two sides in 1996, 
through concluding in 2004 the bilateral negotiations of Vietnam’s accession to the 
WTO and signing The Agreement on Market Access22 and finally to Vietnam’s 
accession to the WTO in 2007. 
 
There is different importance of the EU and Vietnam in their mutual trade, reflecting 
the differences in the size of their economies. The European Union is Vietnam’s 
second most important market for goods, after the USA. In 2018 Vietnam exported 
goods worth about 35.5 billion euros to the EU, which accounted for almost 18% of 
its total exports. According to the EU statistics, EU imports from Vietnam amounted 
to EUR 38 billion at that time, putting the country in 10th position among suppliers 
of goods to the EU market, with a share of almost 2%. In the same year, the EU 
exported goods worth about 11 billion euros to Vietnam, which gave Vietnam the 31st 
position with a share of 0.6% in the EU’s external exports. In turn, the EU ranked 4th 
(after China, South Korea, and Japan) among the most important importers to 
Vietnam23, with a share of 6% (European Union). 
 
In 2017 Vietnam was for the first time among the ten largest exporters to the EU. The 
total value of mutual goods trade in 2019 was almost 53 billion euros, with 
Vietnamese exports to the EU outweighing imports (Figure 4). 
 
Figure 4. Extra-EU trade in goods with Vietnam, 2002-2019 
 
Source: Own study based on (Database - Eurostat, 2020). 
 
The European Union exports mainly machinery and transport equipment, chemicals, 
and agricultural products to Vietnam. The import is dominated by telecommunication 
 
22This agreement suspended the quotas for exports of clothing from Vietnam to the EU as of 
January 1, 2005, three years before its formal accession to the WTO. In return, Vietnam 
committed to increase market access for EU suppliers in various industries (Guide to the EU-
Vietnam Trade and Investment Agreements, n.d., p. 12). 
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equipment, clothing, and food products (European Union, Trade in Goods with 
Vietnam. Detailed View, n.d.). 
 
Vietnam participates in the world trade in services to a minimal extent (it reaches 
about 0.3% of the world turnover), exporting mainly tourist services, and importing 
¬– transportation services. Similarly, low is its trade in services with the EU. One of 
the obstacles to the development of trade in services in Vietnam is the low level of 
servicing of the economy, associated with a shortage of skilled workers and good 
infrastructure, as well as an inefficient business environment in which many internal 
regulations hinder international trade (Alejandro et al., 2012). Rising salaries, 
urbanization of the country, and the dynamic development of private 
entrepreneurship, combined with technological changes in the world and services 
trade liberalizing agreements, provide opportunities to accelerate the Vietnamese 
economy's servicization.  
 
Vietnam attracts more and more foreign direct investment (especially since its 
accession to the WTO), including from the EU, ranked 5th among Vietnam's 80 
investors (Guide to the EU-Vietnam Trade and Investment Agreements, n.d., p. 18). 
According to the Vietnamese Foreign Investment Agency, FDI in 2019 in Vietnam 
attracted 38.2 billion of FDI (7.2% more than in 2018). EU investors account for 
50.1% of total FDI projects and 50.6% of pledged capital (Deshmukh, 2020). 
 
7.  The Content of EVFTA  
 
The analysis of the agreement's content covers the elements relevant to the verification 
of the research hypothesis. Thus, the scope of the research includes the analysis of 
provisions not only relating to achieving economic goals but also the socio-economic 
ones, such as evoking values, regulating a broadly defined scope of human rights and 
freedoms (including labor and social rights), sustainable development and the 
establishment of a new regime for settling international investment disputes. 
 
EVFTA is a new24 generation agreement, which means that it covers: 1) the matter 
establishing a free trade area (liberalization of tariff and non-tariff barriers), providing 
for – like the classic FTA ¬– the gradual elimination of tariffs, elimination or 
reduction of technical barriers to trade (i.e., recognition of standards), as well as 
sanitary and phytosanitary barriers (but without decreasing the level of health and 
consumer protection); 2) elimination of restrictions on the provision of services 
(liberalization of market access to financial, telecommunications, transport, postal and 
courier services, etc.); 3) standards directly related to the economy (but absent from 
earlier FTAs), such as those governing the protection of intellectual property, 
 
24However, this is a relative novelty, as this matter – albeit to a limited extent – was already 
present in the Framework Agreement on Comprehensive Partnership and Cooperation 
Between The European Union and Its Member States (concluded in 2012, entered into force 
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geographical indications, access to the public procurements and facilitation of public-
private partnerships (PPP), etc. 
 
The standards governing sustainable development (about the environment, the 
protection of human rights, workers’ rights and “fair and ethical trade” are new to the 
existing FTAs, although they are viewed by the EU primarily through the prism of the 
value system represented and promoted in external relations. The parties agreed that 
institutions and civil society organizations would be jointly responsible for monitoring 
the implementation of these obligations. The solutions adopted in EVFTA in 
sustainable development co-create the implementation scheme of regulations in trade 
agreements of the European sustainable development model. According to this model, 
in EVFTA, sustainable development has been separated in the Trade and Sustainable 
Development Chapter (TSD)25. The following regulations constitute the three pillars 
of the FTA: 1) the FTA commitments are closely linked to multilateral international 
agreements (including, what is an important novelty, ILO conventions); 2) the 
agreement provides for the operation (and in Vietnam, de facto, the authorities’ 
consent to the establishment) of civil society institutions26 implementing and 
monitoring the implementation of sustainable development; 3) the establishment – 
under EVFTA – of a dispute settlement mechanism for disputes relating to the 
implementation of commitments. 
 
8. EVIPA – A Model of Investor-State Dispute Resolution  
 
The agreement creates a new model for an institutional investor-state dispute 
settlement system. Together with the relevant EVFTA standards, EVIPA can be 
considered the third generation of International Investment Agreements (Recent 
Developments in the International Investment Regime, 2018; Titi, 2018). The 
agreement will establish a Permanent Investment Court, composed of nine permanent 
and independent judges, and a three-person panel will resolve the dispute. 
 
The proceedings will be two-instance, the judgments will be subject to appeal to the 
six-person Permanent Court of Arbitration, which will be sitting in three-member 
panels. An appeal may be based not only on a classic basis, such as violation of the 
law and interpretation of the law, but also on “failure to establish the facts.” The 
agreement provides for transparency of the procedure.27. The parties have committed 
themselves to the enforcement – recognition of the final settlement28. The agreement 
prohibits investors from practicing forum shopping. The costs of the proceedings are 
generally regulated in a loser-pay principle. The adopted solution is treated by the EU 
 
25It is the UE objective to separate a section on TSDs in each EU FTA. 
26These institutions are eligible for EU support programmes, including financial assistance. 
27A certain paradox from this perspective is the fact that no EU Member State is bound by the 
United Nations Convention on Transparency in Treaty-based Investor-State Arbitration of 
2014 (United Nations Treaty Collection, 2020). 
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as a model, according to which a universal system is to be formed (Negotiating 
Directives, 2018). 
 
9.  Conclusions and Practical Implications 
 
The conducted research allowed for positive verification of the formulated hypothesis. 
By signing trade and investment protection agreements, the EU is pursuing a “change 
[Vietnam] through trade” policy. Vietnam is in the process of finding a balance 
between socialism and capitalism, between “self-reliance” (Galtung, 1976) and 
cooperation between regionalism and universalism. The agreements integrate 
Vietnam into the system of international relations based on the values of the UN 
Charter. Cooperation between the parties to the agreements brings added value to each 
party (win-win effect) through direct relations and through diversification of their 
partners in economic relations. The institutionalization of ties between Asian 
countries themselves and between them and the EU is becoming increasingly 
dynamic. 
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